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Nan Jia is Dean's Associate Professor in Business Administration. She holds a PhD in Strategic Management from the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto (Canada). Her research interests include corporate political strategy, business-governance relationships, emerging technology in management, and corporate governance in international business. Nan’s research has been published in multiple top journals in strategic management. She currently serves as an associate editor for the Strategic Management Journal and on the editorial boards of multiple leading academic journals.
Areas of Expertise
RESEARCH + PUBLICATIONS
We develop a political path dependence model that integrates the network embeddedness perspective and the literature on corporate political strategy to understand how firms adapt their political connections when anticorruption efforts lead to the turnover of government officials. We posit that although firms that have close associations with ousted corrupt officials can benefit from both removing existing political connections (“cleaning house”) and developing new connections with their successors (“hosting new guests”), political path dependence enables firms to do the former but constrains them from doing the latter. These effects are magnified when firms are highly dependent on the government, and when the ousted corrupt officials have great political power. Evidence from anticorruption campaigns in China between 2012 and 2018 lends support for our theoretical predictions.
We examine how the presence of a firm’s political connections in a candidate location affects the firm’s likelihood of choosing that location over unconnected but otherwise comparable ones to establish a new subsidiary. First, because of various benefits that political connections can generate for firms, all else equal, firms are more likely to choose the locations in which they have connections with local political leaders. Second, this effect is dampened when local economic conditions may drive local politicians to demand that connected firms engage in economically inefficient but politically desirable tasks, such as hiring superfluous labor. As a result, firms are less likely to choose a politically connected location that also suffers from higher unemployment. Moreover, this dampening effect exists (and becomes stronger) when the connected politicians hold political positions that shoulder greater responsibility for resolving local unemployment issues. Using data on all new subsidiaries established by Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2009, we obtain empirical evidence that corroborates the hypotheses. Therefore, whether and how firms use their political connections in making location choice is strategic in that it is highly dependent on the economic and political context.
Companies are increasingly using artificial intelligence (AI) to provide performance feedback to employees, by tracking employee behavior at work, automating performance evaluations, and recommending job improvements. However, this application of AI has provoked much debate. On the one hand, powerful AI data analytics increase the quality of feedback, which may enhance employee productivity (“deployment effect”). On the other hand, employees may develop a negative perception of AI feedback once it is disclosed to them, thus harming their productivity (“disclosure effect”). We examine these two effects theoretically and test them empirically using data from a field experiment. We find strong evidence that both effects coexist, and that the adverse disclosure effect is mitigated by employees' tenure in the firm. These findings offer pivotal implications for management theory, practice, and public policies.
Law-abiding firms often attempt to conceal their corporate political activity (CPA), yet the concealment of CPA has not been matched by our understanding of the phenomenon. We develop a theoretical framework consisting of three components to analyze firms’ strategy of CPA concealment. First, we provide a detailed conceptual background on CPA concealment, including what concealment of CPA is and how it can occur. Second, we develop an in-depth analysis of the key benefits and costs of concealing CPA for firms. Finally, we integrate this analysis with positive political theory to place our firm-level calculus in the context of policymaking by identifying the public policymakers whom firms are most likely to influence via CPA concealment. Based on this framework, we generate additional empirically testable propositions on how CPA concealment changes with factors at the country, institution, issue, and firm levels. This study is the first to generate systematic theory on firms’ CPA concealment strategies. Moreover, this research context highlights the particular importance of theory for investigating consequential phenomena that yield scarce data – it is theory which guides data discovery ex ante, helps assess bias ex post, and uncovers key insights that empirical analysis alone cannot generate.