Dina Mayzlin

In a range of studies across platforms, online ratings have been shown to be characterized by distributions with disproportionately-heavy tails. We focus on understanding the underlying process that yields such “j-shaped” or “extreme” distributions. We propose a novel theoretical mechanism behind the emergence of “j-shaped” distributions: differential attrition, or the idea that potential reviewers with moderate experiences are more likely to leave the pool of active reviewers than potential reviewers with extreme experiences. We present an analytical model that integrates this mechanism with two extant mechanisms: differential utility and base rates. We show that while all three mechanisms can give rise to extreme distributions, only the utility-based and the attrition-based mechanisms can explain our empirical observation from a large-scale field experiment that an unincentivized solicitation email from an online travel platform reduces review extremity. Subsequent analyses provide clear empirical evidence for the existence of both differential attrition and differential utility.

We examine the effect of managerial response on consumer voice in a dynamic quality environment. We argue that, in this environment, the consumer is motivated to write reviews not only by the possibility that the reviews will impact the decisions of other consumers, but that the reviews will impact the actions of the management and the quality of the service. We examine this empirically in a scenario in which reviewers receive a credible signal that the service provider is listening. Specifically, we examine the "managerial response" feature allowed by many review platforms. We hypothesize that managerial responses will stimulate reviewing activity and, in particular, will stimulate negative reviews that are seen as more impactful. This effect is further heightened because managers respond more and in more detail to negative reviews. Using a multiple-differences specification, we show that reviewing activity and particularly negative reviewing is indeed stimulated by managerial response. Our specification exploits comparison of the
same hotel immediately before and after response initiation and compares a given hotel's reviewing activity on sites with review response initiation to sites that do not allow managerial response. We also explore the mechanism behind the effect using an online experiment.

We model the incentives of individuals to engage in word of mouth (or buzz) about a product, and how a rm may strategically influence this process through its information release and
advertising strategies. Individuals receive utility by improving how others perceive them. A firm restricts access to information, advertising may crowd out word of mouth and a credible commitment not to engage in advertising is valuable for a rm. Finally, we find that the ability of the firm to target advertising to well-connected consumers may be detrimental to the signaling value of word of mouth.