USC Marshall

Bitcoin falls dramatically short of the scale provided by banks for payments. Currently, its ledger grows by the addition of blocks of ∼2,000 transactions every 10 minutes. Intuitively, one would expect that increasing the block capacity would solve this scaling problem. However, we show that increasing the block capacity would be futile. We analyze strategic interactions of miners, who are heterogeneous in their power over block addition, and users, who are heterogeneous in the value of their transactions, using a game-theoretic model. We show that a capacity increase can facilitate large miners to tacitly collude—artificially reversing back the capacity via strategically adding partially filled blocks in order to extract economic rents. This strategic partial filling crowds out low-value payments. Collusion is sustained if the smallest colluding miner has a share of block addition power above a lower bound. We provide empirical evidence of such strategic partial filling of blocks by large miners of Bitcoin. We show that a protocol design intervention can breach the lower bound and eliminate collusion. However, this also makes the system less secure. On the one hand, collusion crowds out low-value payments; on the other hand, if collusion is suppressed, security threatens high-value payments. As a result, it is untenable to include a range of payments with vastly different outside options, willingness to bear security risk, and delay onto a single chain. Thus, we show economic limits to the scalability of Bitcoin. Under these economic limits, collusive rent extraction acts as an effective mechanism to invest in platform security and build responsiveness to demand shocks. These traits are otherwise hard to attain in a disintermediated setting owing to the high cost of consensus.

Blockchain based NFTs (non-fungible tokens) and smart contracts provide creative industries with exciting opportunities. While they have created a great deal of frenzy in markets, in the frenzy there emerges real value for the industries. Traditionally, creators in the creative industries often need to rely on powerful intermediaries to distribute and profit from their creations. NFT and smart contracts provide creators much closer access to content consumers/buyers. Along this line of thought, this article provides marketing researchers with an overview of the unfolding adoption of NFTs and smart contracts in creative industries. We start by pointing out the market frictions and consequent “transaction costs” that creators face traditionally when distributing their creative content to consumers/buyers. Then, we present the basic ideas of smart contracts and NFTs, discussing how they can transform the market by reducing these transaction costs. Meanwhile, we point out limitations and challenges that creators, buyers, and marketplaces might face in the adoption of NFTs and smart contracts. Finally, we raise an abundance of unexplored research questions interesting to both marketing researchers and practitioners.