INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL TOPIC FORUM

PUTTING COMMUNICATION FRONT AND CENTER IN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND ANALYSIS

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We conceptualize the roots of cognitive, linguistic, and communicative theories of institutions and outline the promise and potential of a stronger communication focus for institutional theory. In particular, we outline a theoretical approach that puts communication at the heart of theories of institutions, institutional maintenance, and change, and we label this approach communicative institutionalism. We then provide a brief introduction to the set of articles contained in the Special Topic Forum on Communication, Cognition, and Institutions and describe the innovative theorizing of these articles in the direction of communicative theories of institutions. Finally, we sketch a research agenda and further steps and possibilities for theory and research integrating communication and institutions.

Institutions are all around us. Besides the brute material “facts” or physical bodies inhabiting the world of organizations, most of social reality is defined by established rules and conventions that govern collective thoughts, intentions, and behaviors (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Diehl & McFarland, 2010; Searle, 1995). Since the 1970s, this recognition of the pervasive role of institutions within and across organizations has led to a vast and still growing stream of research in management and organization theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). It is arguably an eclectic stream that consists of studies wedded to various theoretical traditions and camps—or “institutionalisms”—ranging from work on institutional myths to logics and institutional work. At the same time, these studies are part of a broader neoinstitutional turn that, in its entirety, holds a central position within the field of management and organization theory today (Davis, 2010; Scott, 2008).

While neoinstitutionalism may be a broad church encompassing various theoretical traditions, these traditions tend to have a shared
focus on individual and collective cognition as an explanation of the macrolevel features of institutions (DiMaggio, 1997). This cognitive focus has largely distinguished the “new” institutionalism from the “old” institutionalism (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Selznick, 1996) and has, since the 1970s, led to a considerable body of work exploring shared thought structures, or cognitive representations (labeled as frames, categories, templates, schemas, mental models, logics, myths, or scripts), that constitute the legitimate ways of acting socially in particular organizational settings (Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006).

Much of this body of work has been based on the assumption that identifying such individual and collective representations gets at the heart of institutional reality, where “the psychology of mental structures provides a micro-foundation to the sociology of institutions” (DiMaggio, 1997: 271). This guiding assumption has been criticized in recent years (e.g., Jepperson & Meyer, 2011) for being too atomistic in focus and for relying on a form of methodological individualism that considers institutions as aggregations of individuals acting in recognizably similar ways under similar circumstances, assigning similar kinds of cognitive meanings and motives to those actions. This “scaling up” through aggregation from individuals to macrolevel social structures is arguably a viable heuristic that is commonplace within neoinstitutional theory and research (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Besides its methodological value, however, this stance can also be seen as reducing social reality to individual and collective cognitive categories and cognitive dispositions, as “microfoundations” that are assumed to explain the endurance as well as change of institutions. The overly cognitive focus associated with this stance arguably brings with it some theoretical blind spots (Suddaby, 2011) and comes at the expense of fuller and more holistic accounts of the socially constructed nature of institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Jepperson & Meyer, 2011).

In this special topic forum (STF) we aim to provide a platform for such alternative accounts that put communication at the center of institutional theory and analysis and, in doing so, address the strictures of predominantly cognitive theories and models. By “communication” we mean social interaction that builds on speech, gestures, texts, discourses, and other means; thus, we adopt a broad view on communication that encompasses a range of disciplines, theories, and methodological approaches. The main motive behind this aim is that greater attention to the dynamics of communication has the potential to enhance the richness and explanatory power of our theories and models of institutions. However, this potential can, as we believe the articles collected here demonstrate, only be realized through a theoretical and methodological shift in our focus and analysis. Specifically, we suggest an approach where speech and other forms of symbolic interactions are not just seen as expressions or reflections of inner thoughts or collective intentions but as potentially formative of institutional reality—a point that is generally recognized in other fields (e.g., Heritage, 2004; Searle, 1995), although this base insight has not yet been further developed and disseminated within neoinstitutional theory at large.

With this STF we set out to bring together two larger strains of research—cognition and communication—to enrich and advance our understanding of institutions and institutional change in and around organizations. Our goal was to assemble a set of articles bringing in concepts and insights from various theories of social cognition, linguistics, discourse, rhetoric, and media and communication studies. In our call for papers issued in the autumn of 2012, we invited manuscripts that would specifically leverage theoretical ideas and insights related to communication from other areas of the social sciences and would connect these ideas in coherent ways with our understanding of the cognitive basis of institutions. We illustrated this invitation with topics and research questions we saw as particularly relevant, including the suggestion of rethinking and remodeling categorization and legitimation processes from a communication perspective, and exploring the role of broadcast and social media in not only transmitting or carrying but also shaping institutional logics and frames. We particularly encouraged submissions that would introduce new constructs or concepts related to communication into institutional theory, such as voice, dialogue, and speech acts, thus going beyond traditions like rhetoric and discourse that already have some traction within institutional research.

Our enthusiasm for this topic met with a similar enthusiasm from researchers in the field, with sixty submissions that in one way or an-
other examined the role of communication or communication-related concepts such as audiences, genres, and discourse. In reading through these papers, we noticed the excitement and potential offered by inserting a stronger emphasis on communication into institutional theory and analysis. At the same time we observed that many of the submissions tended to focus on more conventional perspectives in institutional theory, rather than on introducing new communication-related constructs and models, and potentially alternative theoretical grounds, to advance our understanding of institutions. Another striking observation was the difference between papers in their assumptions regarding speech and communication; quite a number focused on how aspects of speech and communication reflect particular cognitive outcomes or representations—in a sense, provide a window into the cognitive processes of institutional maintenance or change—whereas others focused on how speech and communication are formative, or constitutive, of a particular institution and thus bring about cognitive outcomes.

The papers selected for inclusion in this STF reflect these emphases and, hence, also the range of work currently being carried out in this area of institutional research. In order to place the articles in context, we first describe the overall promise and potential implications of bringing a stronger communication focus into institutional theory and analysis. We then introduce the articles and their central contributions, and we conclude by sketching a research agenda and suggesting a number of directions for further theory development and research.

**COMMUNICATION, COGNITION, AND INSTITUTIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES**

**Communication As a Conduit**

Traditional accounts of institutionalization and institutional change have backgounded communication or treated it as a black box (Suddaby, 2011). The direct consequence of this neglect has been that when communication is recognized, it is largely assumed to operate as a conduit or channel through which cognitive content (such as information or semantic meaning) is disseminated and spread across an institutional setting or field (Beckert, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012). In such a conduit model of communication, cognitive content and pragmatic intentions of actors are easily transferred to other actors, with the effectiveness of such transfers being primarily mediated by the cognitive capacity to process information and by the social ties of the actors involved.

An obvious limitation of models built on this “conduit metaphor” (Reddy, 1979) is their underlying epistemology, which considers communication—or, indeed, any acts of symbolic meaning construction—as an uncomplicated process of sending and receiving messages, where any semantic or pragmatic outcomes are already largely prefigured and predetermined by actors initiating the communication. This assumption, in fact, underplays degrees of agency that both sending and receiving actors may have in processes of communication and meaning construction (Schober & Brennan, 2003), and it further treats language and cognition as isomorphic. When language is thus understood as merely a means to encode, transfer, and decode cognitive contents between communicating actors, it is also assumed to offer a direct window into individual and collective cognition as it exists in an institutional setting or field at a particular point in time. Schneiberg and Clemens suggest that the common measurement strategy among neoinstitutional researchers has indeed been “to use actors’ discursive output as topics for analysis, that is, as documentation of cognitive frames, principles, or institutional logics” (2006: 211). They critique this strategy, and the conduit metaphor on which it rests, by emphasizing that actors may be working from different cognitive principles and schemes than what they communicate in public and may also not “mean what they say” in the sense that discursive output does not flow directly from cognition” (2006: 211).

**Performative Approaches to Language and Institutions**

The limitations of the conduit image are to some extent offset by performative approaches to communication that, since the early 2000s, have been introduced into neoinstitutional theory. These approaches, sometimes brought together under the label rhetorical institutionalism (Green & Li, 2011), include theory and research on framing (Fiss & Zajac, 2006), tropes (Elzio & Ferraro, 2010), discourse (Phillips, Law-
formance, & Hardy, 2004), and rhetoric (Green, 2004) within institutional settings and fields. A key assumption of these approaches is that any collective cognition or joint understanding that forms the basis for institutions is not simply preexisting and accessed or shared by individuals but is, in effect, constantly produced, or reproduced, in the use and exchange of language as a central part of communication (e.g., Green, 2004; Phillips et al., 2004). Specifically, performative approaches assume that any cognitive contents and inferences for institutionally prescribed actions are produced and realized through and in the use of language (e.g., Green, Li, & Nohria, 2009; Phillips et al., 2004). Language (but conceivably also other symbolic expressions, such as gestures and bodily signals) has a performative role in that its use pragmatically affects actors in their thoughts and behaviors, which also means that language in its use bears the brunt of initiating broader cognitive change at the level of an institutional field. Studies of the role of rhetoric and discourse in the context of institutions, for example, focus on the structure and characteristics of the language being used (such as certain keywords, idioms, or rhetorical arguments) by actors, as ways of (re)producing institutions, and explore how linguistic choices or alterations to a linguistic repertoire may, in turn, initiate processes of institutional change (e.g., Green & Li, 2011; Jones, Maoret, Massa, & Svejenova, 2012; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004).

The advantage of these performative approaches is that, compared to a strict conduit model, they consider language not as a neutral, external window into cognition but as performative and, thus, to a greater or lesser extent formative of the cognitive basis of institutions, as well as of any changes to such institutions. Hence, these traditions accord a much more central role to all forms of discourse, including rhetoric, framing, messages, vocabularies, and narratives within neoinstitutional theory and analysis. Some of these approaches, such as the work drawing from framing and new rhetoric, grant a degree of agency to individual actors and tend to have a situated focus on the way in which the use of certain words or phrases, as alternative framings, may trigger or initiate broader cognitive change within an institutional setting or field (e.g., Green et al., 2009; Rhee & Fiss, in press). Other approaches, such as Foucauldian or critical discourse analysis, however, consider the formative role and effect of language as strong and almost all-encompassing, assuming that broader discourses or rhetorical vocabularies “bear down” on individual actors, have a hold over them (in a Foucauldian sense even “work through them”), and, in doing so, reproduce and thus maintain institutions (e.g., Phillips et al., 2004).

These various performative traditions differ in their epistemological assumptions, but they nonetheless share the broader assumption that language use, akin to a physical force (Talmy, 2000), may produce or engender cognitive reactions. The pragmatic force of language, then, is its capacity to effectuate cognitive change, with the choice of certain words (such as slogans, metaphors, and idioms) and grammatical or stylistic features having a direct impact on individuals and groups within an institutional setting or field. Not surprisingly, therefore, performative approaches often tend to start analyses with a focus on certain actors, as “speakers,” in key discursive positions and analyze the characteristics of their language use, given that their language has a direct impact, to a greater or lesser extent, on other actors, as “listeners.” The basic point here is that these performative approaches tend to be asymmetrical in that they effectively start with the pragmatic aspect of speakers’ intentions but largely neglect listeners as active agents, who are instead cast as a speaker-in-waiting whose basic role is to respond (or not) to a speaker’s rhetoric or discourse (Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000). This also implies that the intentions and acts of a speaker are usually privileged over those of the listener or recipient, as opposed to viewing their communication as a joint activity.

Sweetser (1990) explained this asymmetrical emphasis by suggesting that performative approaches such as speech act theory, rhetoric, and discourse theory still hark back to a basic conduit or transfer model of communication (see also Searle, 1969). That is, a speech act, rhetorical argument, or discursive utterance is assumed to “transfer” discursive objects from a speaker to a listener in order to create its force (see, for example, Quinn & Dutton, 2005). As Sweetser notes:

Speech acts are metaphorically treated as exchange or transfer of objects from one interlocutor to the other; the objects are linguistic forms, which are containers for meaning. This object-
exchange metaphor for speech exchange has been analyzed under the name of the ‘conduit metaphor’ (Reddy, 1979) (1990: 20).

That performative approaches maintain the premise of a basic conduit model as an image of communication is perhaps not that surprising. Indeed, the main focus of performative approaches is on language as a “force” (Sweetser, 1990; Traugott, 1991; Traugott & Dasher, 2005) directly shaping cognitive outcomes in “other” actors across an institutional setting or field, rather than more broadly on episodes or events of communication, including characteristics of the communicating actors, the media used to carry messages, and the way in which actors adapt and respond to each other as part of their interaction (Ashcraft, Kuhn, & Cooren, 2009; Steinberg, 1998). This notion of language as a force may align well with the notion of institutional settings and fields harboring forces that condition and constrain actors in their thoughts and behaviors (e.g., Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Yet at the same time it presupposes a rather linear form of causality (cf. Clark, 1996) around the “net effects” realized by a competition between rhetorical vocabularies or discourses in a field (Delbridge & Fiss, 2013), as opposed to theorizing more complex forms of causality associated with institutional maintenance and change.

Communication As Constitutive of Institutions

These points bring us to a third approach to communication and cognition in the context of institutions. We label this approach communicative institutionalism since it draws on an image of communication as a joint activity within which both speakers and addressees coproduce, moment by moment, an understanding of their social relationship and joint understanding (cf. Tuomela, 2002). In this view, then, communication is seen as “the ongoing, dynamic, interactive process of manipulating symbols toward the creation, maintenance, destruction, and/or transformation of meanings, which are axial—not peripheral—to organizational existence and organizing phenomena” (Ashcraft et al., 2009: 22). Put differently, communication is a process through which collective forms such as institutions are constructed in and through interaction, instead of being merely a conduit for enacting discourses (Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004). Echoing Dewey’s famous statement, the premise here is that collective forms such as “society not only... [continue] to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication” (1944/1916: 4).

In this sense communication, in the form of continuous interactions at multiple levels and with multiple potential outcomes, is seen to constitute institutions. This view does not negate the performative character of language, which is, in fact, crucial for exploring the constitutive nature of communication (Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011). Nor does it argue that institutions are not manifested in communication (Lammers, 2011; Lammers & Barbour, 2006). Instead, it emphasizes that any performance is as much the product of the agent that/who is deemed performing it as the product of the people who attend and interpret/respond to such performance—analysts included... [and thus] any performance will never be reducible to the way it was intended or meant by its producer (Cooren et al., 2011: 1152).

In other words, the joint cognitive understandings and meanings that emerge (in ongoing fashion) from communication are unlikely to be isomorphic with the original intentions of the multiple participants engaged in it. Ambiguity, indeterminacy, and heterogeneity across actors are to be expected (Seo & Creed, 2002), suggesting, in turn, a more complex set of interactions and ensuing institutional outcomes than is often provided by more linear accounts around hegemonic discourses, effective rhetoric, and institutional entrepreneurs.

Institutions, as common cognitive understandings, are, importantly, also an emergent effect, or outcome, of ongoing processes of communication between diverse actors. Rather than casting institutions as entities at a different level of analysis and divorced from acts and practices of discourse and communication, we advocate for a perspective that accounts for the communicative constitution, maintenance, and transformation of institutions. This latter point may be the most radical for neoinstitutional scholars, since it seems to go against the common tendency to oppose structure and action and macro and micro levels of analysis. Yet the key suggestion is not to do away with those dualisms but to recognize the fundamental importance of communication, which requires theory and analysis that are, as Fairhurst and Putnam (2004: 6) put it,
“grounded in action” and, thus, “inhabited” (Hallett, 2010) in the first place. Institutions, in other words, are performed and negotiated on the terra firma of local, situated interactions (Bechky, 2011; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Lea, 2011; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). The resulting emergent outcomes—in terms of maintaining or changing an institution—may be confined to a specific set of interacting actors but may also spread and be more widely shared across a group of actors and organizations in an institutional field (Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013; Loewenstein, Ocasio, & Jones, 2012). Significantly, such spread and diffusion is itself contingent on communication.

This interactive model of communication has not yet been fully explored in the context of institutions. There are, however, some scholars who are starting to study and analyze institutions from this perspective (e.g., Ansari, Wijen, & Gray, 2013; Loewenstein et al., 2012). For instance, McPherson and Sauder (2013) have examined institutional logics in the context of negotiations in drug courts. These authors conceptualize logics as organizing principles, figures of speech, and arguments that are employed in interactions “on the ground,” allowing various actors to coordinate and manage their work and to reach consensus in an institutionally complex environment. In shifting from a conduit to an interactive model of communication, they in turn argue that

in order to fully comprehend institutional maintenance and change, organizational scholars must pay careful attention to the ways in which institutions are negotiated, interpreted and enacted by individuals as they interact. Thus it is through dynamic local processes that institutional logics are attached to organizational activity in symbolic and substantive ways as actors constitute and shape their meaning and relevance (2013: 168; emphasis added).

This interactive model puts communication at the center of institutional theory and analysis. It accords a constitutive role to communication, since it is primarily in and through communication that institutions exist and are performed and given shape. The metaphor of constitution suggests that in and through interaction actors themselves construct a common base of understanding regulating their thoughts and behaviors. Such understanding may be contingent on prior interactions and may make use of available communal conventions, but it may also be affected by the dynamics of the interaction itself (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). This view of a communicative institutionalism holds, we believe, great promise. In Table 1 we summarize the core tenets of this perspective alongside the other two main institutional approaches and their conceptualization of communication.

ARTICLES IN THE SPECIAL TOPIC FORUM

Against the background of our discussion of communication and cognition, we now turn to the five articles contained in this STF. In our view each of these has important implications for advancing a communicative perspective on institutions, and each pushes our thinking about institutions forward in important ways. Table 2 presents a brief summary of each article, describing its primary purpose, level of analysis, theoretical base, and implications for research. Three of the articles focus on the role of discourse and communication in the maintenance and change of institutions at large, whereas two focus more specifically on institutional processes, such as the legitimization or abandonment of practices. In some of the articles existing theory on discourse and rhetoric is extended and elaborated into novel theoretical arguments and explanations. In other articles new ideas and theories are brought in from adjacent fields (such as psycholinguistics and communication theory) and suggest promising new lines of theorizing and research. All five articles, however, bring novel theoretical perspectives to bear on familiar problems and questions within institutional theory and present testable models and propositions that can be directly extended into empirical research.

The first study sets the overall agenda for the STF by explicitly searching for processes of communication that constitute the basis of macroinstitutional logics. Ocasio, Loewenstein, and Nigam (2015) begin their article by noting that while communication in particular contexts has typically been considered as instantiating or reproducing institutional logics, the reverse argument—that communication constitutes logics—holds great potential for advancing our understanding of the durability and change of logics. Yet, as they argue, with a few exceptions (e.g., McPherson & Sauder, 2013), this causal
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theoretical Approach</th>
<th>Classic Neoinstitutional Theory (including most work on institutional adoption, change, and logics)</th>
<th>Rhetorical Institutionalism (including discourse, rhetoric, frame, and speech act theory)</th>
<th>Communicative Institutionalism (an emerging area of research at the intersection of communication, cognition, and institutional theory/theories)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Basic perspective on communication</td>
<td>Conduit model of communication: communication as the channeling or transmission of cognitive contents and intentions between actors</td>
<td>Performative model of communication: predominant focus on language as a force that (physically) prompts cognitive reactions in actors</td>
<td>Interactive model of communication: communication as a process of interaction within which actors exchange views and build up mutual understanding</td>
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<td>Link of communication to cognition</td>
<td>Communication as a neutral transmission of cognitive contents; communication has, causally, a negligible role in explaining (cognitive) institutional maintenance and change</td>
<td>Communication as an asymmetrical process of senders with their language influencing and cognitively priming recipients; language (as part of communication) has a direct impact on (cognitive) institutional maintenance and change</td>
<td>Communication involves moment-by-moment dialogue and interaction between actors, who coordinate the dialogue and any joint understanding they build up; communication (including but not limited to language) has a constitutive role in (cognitive) institutional maintenance and change</td>
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<td>Study</td>
<td>Primary Purpose</td>
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<td>Ocasio, Loewenstein, &amp; Nigam:</td>
<td>To explain how, through specific communication processes—coordinating, sensegiving, translating, and theorizing—categorical distinctions and durable principles are produced and reproduced and form the basis of institutional logics</td>
<td>Micro to macro level of analysis</td>
<td>Psycholinguistics (e.g., Clark, 1996; Levinson, 2000) and research on communication as constitutive of organizations (e.g., Taylor &amp; Van Every, 2000)</td>
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<td>Bitektine &amp; Haack: &quot;The 'Macro' and the 'Micro' of Legitimacy: Toward a Multilevel Theory of the Legitimacy Process&quot;</td>
<td>To develop a model that describes and explains institutional stability and change at multiple levels of analysis by explaining the communicative and cognitive mechanisms linking individual judgments and macrolevel agreements</td>
<td>Micro to macro level of analysis</td>
<td>Behavioral decision making (e.g., Tost, 2011) and public opinion research (e.g., Noelle-Neumann &amp; Petersen, 2004)</td>
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<td>Harmon, Green, &amp; Goodnight:</td>
<td>To describe and explain institutional maintenance and change based on the degree to which rhetoric (specifically, the rhetorical backing for the legitimacy of a practice) within a field is stable and settled or dynamic and evolving</td>
<td>Macro level of analysis</td>
<td>Rhetoric and pragmatics: Toulmin’s argumentation theory (Toulmin, 1958)</td>
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<td>Clemente &amp; Roulet: &quot;Public Opinion As a Source of Deinstitutionalization: A ‘Spiral of Silence’ Approach&quot;</td>
<td>To develop a communication-informed account of how initial acts of opposition toward a practice in a field may evolve into a majority view, leading, in turn, to the delegitimization of the practice</td>
<td>Micro to macro level of analysis</td>
<td>Mass communication theory: Noelle-Neumann &amp; Petersen’s (2004) spiral of silence theory</td>
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<td>Gray, Purdy, &amp; Ansari: &quot;From Interactions to Institutions: Microprocesses of Framing and Mechanisms for the Structuring of Institutional Fields&quot;</td>
<td>To develop a process theory of how interactively established frames in dyads and groups may spread and diffuse across an institutional field and may, in turn, come to structure interactions and meanings within that field</td>
<td>Micro to macro level of analysis</td>
<td>Theory on interactional framing (e.g., Collins, 2004; Goffman, 1974) and structuration theory (e.g., Giddens, 1984)</td>
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link has only been theorized in a limited way. Rooting their arguments in a realist epistemology, their propositions connect communication processes with the structuring effects and causal powers of institutional logics and practices. More precisely, they formalize and elaborate theory on how specific processes of communication—coordinating, sensegiving, translating, and theorizing—demarcate cognitive categories of understanding, help individuals form collective bonds or relationships around those categories, and link those categories to specific practices and experiences. In this way these processes constitute the very basis of how cognitive categories become culturally shared and conventional in a particular institutional setting. Ocasio et al. assume, in turn, that the communicative constitution of such categories is central to the establishment of common vocabularies of practice (with words and idioms systematically referencing those categories), as well as broader institutional logics, or value sets and behaviors that are seen to govern practices in a particular setting. These theoretical ideas and arguments offer a number of direct opportunities for further research. Not only can the propositions they offer on each of the communication processes be tested directly, but further research may also model the different forms of communication together to explore the tipping points that constitute transitions in institutional categories, vocabularies, and logics.

Bitektine and Haack (2015) also present a multilevel model detailing the behavioral and cognitive factors affecting legitimacy judgments at both a microindividual and macrosocietal level of analysis. The authors draw on research in behavioral decision making and public opinion research to tease out the cognitive conditions and pressures associated with legitimacy judgments at both levels. They argue that commonly accepted, and thus institutionalized, legitimacy judgments are characterized by applying norms that are generally seen to be valid, whereas individual-level judgments involve assessments of what norms are appropriate in a particular context of action. Linking these two levels, they argue that institutional change is instigated through a questioning by actors of the general validity of previous norms in a particular setting or through the import of an alternative set of ideas and norms that, based on their validity in other societal domains, can equally be said to be appropriate. Their framework also details a number of important “social actors,” such as the news media and regulators, that mediate and magnify the processes of maintenance or change linking the individual and macro levels of analysis. Future research may explore, in a field setting as well as potentially in a laboratory setting, the cognitive conditions and pressures associated with legitimacy judgments. This model could be further extended with research that specifically focuses on a meso level of analysis, involving interactions between individual actors, groups, and organizations that, arguably, play a crucial role in either maintaining the status quo or changing legitimacy judgments by diffusing alternative sets of values and norms.

Harmon, Green, and Goodnight (2015) take on a similar quest in their article, focusing on how the rhetoric used within a field reflects processes of institutional maintenance and change. They also try to characterize conditions reflecting maintenance and change, but where Bitektine and Haack primarily focus on cognitive dispositions in legitimacy judgments, these authors focus instead on the homogeneity and structure of the rhetoric, or argument, that is being used to legitimize or delegitimize a set of practices. Drawing on Toulmin’s (1958) classic work on rhetoric and argumentation, they argue that actors can use rhetoric in two structurally different ways. First, actors can use the rhetoric that is common to an argumentative field (labeled intrafield rhetoric) and, while doing so, largely reiterate and accept the common grounds and backing for the claims that are being made about a certain practice. Second, actors can also use forms of rhetoric that are more diffuse and, furthermore, in their backing and grounds, refer to other argumentative fields (labeled interfield rhetoric). The onset of interfield rhetoric in a particular setting, Harmon et al. argue, is reflective of processes of change as prevailing norms are starting to shift. As such, the authors see intrafield and interfield rhetoric as important markers of shifts in the pendulum between institutional maintenance and change. This presents a cogent argument that warrants further empirical research to tease out its reach and boundary conditions. For example, it may well be that in institutionally complex environments (e.g., Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micolotta, & Lounsbury, 2011) different forms of rhet-
oric and norms may persist, rather than marking the onset of a wholesale change to a new institutional order. Future empirical research may therefore explore and elucidate the details around the basic propositions presented in the article. We also believe, in line with our earlier discussion, that there is promise in focusing not only on rhetoric as reflective of institutional maintenance and change (effectively considering it as a marker or “window into” maintenance or change) but also on how specific rhetorical acts (such as, for example, naturalizing analogies [Douglas, 1986]) in contexts of communication may either validate and justify already existing norms or instigate and trigger processes of institutional change. This would cast rhetoric, as part of communication, as formative rather than just reflective of processes of institutional maintenance and change.

Clemente and Roulet (2015) draw on a well-established theory in mass communication and public opinion research to develop a model of how practices in an institutional field may become deinstitutionalized. The “spiral of silence” theory (Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004) suggests that through social pressures and a fear of being in the minority, individual opinions gradually coalesce into homogenous public opinion. This is akin to a spiraling process, in the sense that it increasingly boosts and amplifies the voice of those who are, or have become, the majority, while suppressing the voice of those in the minority. The authors argue that similar processes are at play around the legitimation and delegitimization of practices in institutional fields. Besides this broad parallel, they also extend and fine-tune their argumentation to this setting, recognizing the differences that exist between opinion formation in society and the process of legitimacy judgments in specific institutional fields. These differences aside, the use of a grounded and well-established theory from mass communication is an inspired choice since it offers a set of predictions and concepts that, by extension, can be usefully modeled in an institutional setting. Empirical research may set out to test these predictions and to put more detail to the schematic model that Clemente and Roulet provide. Such further research may also, we suggest, try to model the spiral of silence dynamic in institutionally complex environments, where alternative opinions, in effect, may be seen to compete for attention and actors actively strive to mobilize others to become a dominant, if not the majority, opinion in a field.

In the fifth and final article in the set, Gray, Purdy, and Ansari (2015) develop a framing perspective on the formation and change of collective meanings and interpretations in an institutional field. Explicitly positioning themselves against macrosociological “top-down” perspectives on institutions, they set out to develop a process theory of how institutions emerge “bottom-up” in interactions where actors frame alternative meanings and, over time, may gradually converge on common frames that become institutionalized. Their process theory presents specific details on the microprocesses at the level of these interactions that sustain and energize the adoption of a certain frame over others and, thus, may lay the basis for broader institutional change. A further contribution of their process theory is that it combines a focus on the content of interactions, in the form of framing, with an account of how interactions themselves may take on a certain structure as an interaction order through repetition and regularity, affecting the spread and diffusion of frames across an institutional field. In this way they explicitly scale up from a micro to a macro level, and in a manner that clearly foregrounds the role of interactions and, thus, communication. Their article is probably the broadest in reach in that it maneuvers all the way from acts of framing in specific contexts of interaction to macro field-level conditions and outcomes. Future research may draw on this process theory and add more detail to the high-level processes and mechanisms these authors develop. As Gray et al. suggest, their framing perspective is not only well placed to scale up from a micro to a macro level of analysis but also supple enough to be combined with alternative theoretical lenses, such as identity and materiality, that may affect how and why meanings are constructed, spread, and become institutionalized over time.

Taken together, these five articles deepen our understanding of the role of discourse and communication in institutional maintenance and change. Four of the articles present multilevel models that explain both the durability of institutions and the roots of change. As such, the articles in this forum offer both general and specific implications for empirical research moving forward, as well as some new insights and ideas on how our theorizing on institutions can ad-
vance. The articles in this forum may thus serve as signposts for further research, suggesting ways in which discourse and communication can be more fully incorporated both conceptually and empirically into institutional research.

This said, the studies collected here also indicate the need for further reflection. A general observation is that some of their arguments are still, to a large extent, rooted in a performative rather than a truly interactive approach to communication. This brings an emphasis on the structure of language either as reflecting institutional conditions of stability or change, as in the articles by Bitektine and Haack and Harmon et al., or as a pragmatic force, energizing and channeling institutional dynamics, as highlighted by Ocasio et al. Because of this emphasis, there is perhaps less of a focus on the role of actors and their agency in actively and creatively using language in communicative interactions, with the focus instead placed on the structure and functions of language and their effect on individual and collective cognition. This is in part because these articles are anchored in theoretical bases that are primarily cognitive and linguistic in orientation, rather than communicative (see Table 2). That is, Clemente and Roulet’s is the only article that directly draws on communication theory, extending a model from mass communication theory, while Ocasio et al. and Gray et al. base their theorizing in part on concepts and ideas from interactional linguistics and communication theory. This general observation, in our view, signals the real possibilities that exist for further theorizing that is geared more explicitly toward conceptualizing the interactive and processual dynamics that link the micro to the macro level of analysis in institutional theory (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Such theorizing would add considerably to our understanding not only of when linguistic and cognitive categories are reflective of institutions but of how these are being used in interactions (Hallett, 2010) and constitute the very basis of institutional maintenance or change.

DISCUSSION: TOWARD A COMMUNICATION-CENTERED RESEARCH AGENDA FOR INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

In the remainder of this introduction we sketch a research agenda for the communicative institutionalism we have proposed here, outlining the opportunities and benefits of a communication-based perspective on institutions, institutional maintenance, and change. The suggestions that we offer are admittedly only selective, and we recognize that there may be many other options and pathways for further research. Yet the overview that we present here does, we hope, provide some useful pointers to further research. We structure our suggestions by genre and mode of communication into three broad areas: (1) framing; (2) rhetoric, discourse, and logics; and (3) categorization. For each of these areas we highlight how centering on communication opens up opportunities to advance institutional theory and analysis.

Framing

The notion of framing has already gained considerable currency as a communication-centered approach to understanding meaning construction in and around organizations (Ansari et al., 2013; Gray et al., 2015). As Cornelissen and Werner (2014) note in a recent review, the use of framing as a construct ranges from microlevel conceptualizations and effects (e.g., Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Weber & Mayer, 2011) to meso-level notions of strategic frames and framing (e.g., Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007) and macrolevel ideas such as field and institutional frames, as well as their contestation (Beckert, 2010; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Meyer & Hölllerer, 2010). In our view, much of the attractiveness of frames as a construct for management scholars lies in their ability to connect the macrostructural aspects of collective meaning structures with the microinteractional level where much of the negotiation of meaning takes place. It is this dual nature of frames that places them squarely at the center of a communicative approach to understanding institutions and their creation and change, as well as their consequences. In particular, there exist intriguing opportunities at the micro level to understand the interactive production and reproduction of institutions and their logics through framing in context, where frames, for instance, mediate between individuals’ convictions and others’ expectations (Cornelissen, 2012). Such work would also allow bridging to the inhabited institutionalism promoted by Hallett (2010) and others.
At the meso level, the study of strategic and collective action framing in particular would benefit from more attention to the coconstruction of meaning in the communicative process. For instance, recent studies have shifted attention from merely examining the choice of frame to understanding related and much more audience-centered aspects of the framing process, such as the identity of the frame articulator as constructed by the audience or the context in which frames are offered (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Rhee & Fiss, in press), including the dynamics of the institutional context. Yet while this work has shifted the focus toward the ways in which strategic meaning making is either enhanced or limited by the coconstruction of meaning, the notion of frame resonance (e.g., Babb, 1996) would offer a particularly attractive field to develop a truly interactive understanding of how meaning is coconstructed. Whereas prior research has conceptualized frame resonance primarily in terms of an audience’s receptiveness to certain framing strategies, the view advanced here would shift the focus further toward examining, for instance, how frame resonance operates through an interactive process by which the frames of organizational actors and their audiences may, over time, converge, synchronize, or diverge (cf. Corman, Kuhn, Mcphee, & Dooley, 2002).

Finally, research at the macro level has already embraced, to a considerable extent, the collective construction of field or institutional frames. Especially the notion of frame contests points our attention to, for instance, the ways in which coalitions of actors promote or challenge certain conceptions or understandings of social reality (e.g., Maguire et al., 2004; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). While social movement theorists have proposed several concepts, such as frame bridging and alignment, to examine this process, this analysis of framing struggles has yet to engage more deeply with the communication literature. For instance, the notion of co-orientation (Broom, 1977) would appear to provide a helpful perspective to understand the way that frame resonance and alignment may be achieved.

**Rhetoric, Discourse, and Logics**

Rhetoric already has significant traction as part of institutional analysis, highlighting how communication is central to institutional diffusion and change (Green, 2004; Green & Li, 2011). In particular, the so-called new rhetoric (Cheney, Christensen, Conrad, & Lair, 2004; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1959) has been used by scholars to explore such processes as the diffusion of practices (Green, 2004; Green et al., 2009) and their legitimation (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), as exemplified by Harmon et al.’s article in this STF. Another related stream of institutional research has drawn on discursive theories and methods to study institutions (Phillips et al., 2004). From this perspective, institutions are constituted by discourses, and such an analysis has been used to better understand institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization processes (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Maguire & Hardy, 2009), as well as specific topics like legitimation (Vaara & Tienari, 2008). In the spirit of fostering a stronger communication focus, we believe there may be value in further embedding discursive and rhetorical analyses within communicative contexts. This would combine the strengths of such analyses with the motives and agency of interactants and with aspects of their communication, including the media used to communicate (Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2011). Doing so may enrich theory and analysis and would potentially bring more fine-grained detail to our understanding of institutional reproduction and change as a dynamic process in which discourses and rhetoric are used, created, and transformed by interactants, rather than simply transmitted or channeled through them.

One potential application of studying discourse and rhetoric in connection with institutions is the analysis of the communicative construction of institutional logics. In recent studies institutional logics have been conceptualized either as higher-order structuring dimensions (such as authority, identity, and governance) ruling organizations and their behaviors (e.g., Thornton et al., 2012) or as arguments and associated meanings (e.g., Green, 2004; Green et al., 2009; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). However, these two conceptualizations are not necessarily antagonistic but, rather, can be reconciled and may, in fact, complement each other, as shown by Ocasio et al. in this STF. A promising avenue of research concerns the study of multilevel phenomena like institutional maintenance and transformation, where at macro levels of analy-
sis logics can be seen as structuring dimensions, whereas at micro levels of analysis logics may be considered as discursive or argumentative flows.

From a communicative perspective, in further research scholars may employ discourse and rhetoric to study how institutional logics are used and mobilized in concrete actions (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). In this view actors make sense of institutional logics via discourses and use these discourses in their interactions. As such, institutional logics as proceeding from a superordinate institutional order may be conceptualized as discourses or discursive aspects of institutional order. From the communicative perspective on institutions, it would be important to emphasize that these discourses may be used in various manners and situations, thus paving the way for resolving or exacerbating ambiguity and contradiction between logics, and for giving birth to replacement, transformation, or hybridity across logics, the analysis of which may in fact help to understand institutional complexity in a novel way.

Rhetoric furthermore may be linked with this kind of analysis, and it offers specific advantages for targeted analysis of institutional logics. From a rhetorical perspective, institutional logics can be seen as arguments, sets of linked propositions that in a particular social context may exert a persuasive force on actors. Across institutional fields and settings, the use and force of such propositions may vary (Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1979). Thus, when scholars study changes in field logics, they can draw on rhetoric and argumentation theory to determine precisely how arguments (i.e., claims, grounds, warrants, and backings) and their underlying logic have changed. An added advantage of casting institutional logics as arguments is that it draws attention to the previously built-up communication environment in which logics, as arguments, are uttered (Aakhus, 2007) against the backdrop of alternative, forgotten, or suppressed arguments (Green et al., 2009; Jackson, 2013).

**Categorization**

Work on categories and categorization processes presents another area of neoinstitutional research that stands to benefit from a stronger focus on communication. In recent years there has been a surge of interest in work on categorization and categories at the level of industries, markets, and firms (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Vergne & Wry, 2014). Much of this work has been inspired by Zuckerman’s (1999) work on the categorical imperative and by the increasing focus of organizational ecology research on questions of categorical purity (Hannan, Polos, & Carroll, 2007). Work on categories is also turning to communicative questions around the very process of categorization and the flexible and changing ways in which categories can be constructed, reconfigured, or even combined by organizational actors in particular industry and market contexts (Glynn & Navis, 2013; Kennedy, Lo, & Lounsbury, 2010; Vergne & Wry, 2014). This complements research on the priming and effects of categories—as culturally grounded cognitive schemas—on the expectations and behaviors of audiences, with a focus on the microprocesses of communication through which such categories are defined and demarcated and, thus, emerge in the first place (cf. Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

To address these questions, scholars have recently started to define a theoretical vocabulary better able to describe and explain both the construction (or emergence) and effects of categories (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2010; Vergne & Wry, 2014). Some authors have, for this purpose, revisited cognitive psychological research on, for example, priming and prototype effects (Durand & Paolella, 2013). Since categorization processes may rely on goal-based motivations (Barsalou, 1991)—that is, categories reflect actors’ own purposes rather than preexisting prototypes—this may fundamentally affect how, for instance, producers and consumers negotiate the legitimacy of categories. For example, whereas in some market contexts producers are able to convince buyers and consumers of their capabilities and performance by referring to well-identifiable prototypical categories, in other instances buyers and consumers construct, of their own volition, what they consider to be appropriate categories rather independently of any producer’s communication. In both legitimate and contested industries this may lead to important consequences, such as a higher likelihood of asset divestments to avoid assimilation with what are seen to be negatively valued firms in the eyes of consumers (Durand & Vergne, in press). Here research could further investigate the interac-
itions between producers and audiences, with cognitive categorizations being an outcome of the motives of the various parties as well as of the communication that has taken place (Kennedy, 2008). In particular, empirical cases of norm infringement, contestation, or organizational misconduct would lend themselves well to such research that might then focus on studying shifts in legitimacy as a result of interactions between producers and audiences and any relevant intermediaries (e.g., the media, rating and accreditation agencies).

One other source of inspiration for categorization research is the work in cognitive linguistics on categories (Barsalou, 1991; Lakoff, 1987), which, from its founding, has been closely allied with the work in cognitive psychology but also brings a distinct focus on how speech and language are not only reflective of but also integral to categorization processes. Lakoff (1987), in his landmark book on categorization, highlights in particular two forms of speech, which he casts as fundamental to categorization: metaphor and metonymy. Both are often considered as figurative modes of speech, or tropes, yet linguists and communication scholars have long recognized the fundamental role of both forms of speech in language and categorization in general (a point taken on, for example, by Barley [1983] and Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey [2008] in relation to institutional research).

Broadly speaking, metaphor involves an analogical comparison in language and thought where a term or concept (called the target) is likened to another (called the source), with the source stemming from a category of knowledge and language use that was not previously associated with the target (e.g., Cornelissen, 2005). Kennedy and Fiss (2013) suggest that such analogical comparisons are central to the formation of new categories (see also Navis & Glynn, 2010). They write: “New categories become common knowledge when a private or one-off insight applies a familiar meaning, often by analogy or translation, to a novel, unfamiliar occasion or for unusual purposes, and the situation and meaning then become widely accepted” (Kennedy & Fiss, 2013: 1145–1146). Metaphorical language and thought, in fact, tend to assume a lateral or horizontal process that draws analogies across socially familiar registers of language and categories of knowledge. In comparison, metonymies rely on an exchange between parts within the same domain of language use and knowledge. They involve a vertical or contiguous mapping or exchange between parts and elements of a register of language and associated category of thought. Such a mapping or exchange typically involves a part-whole or whole-part substitution in speech and thought. A key feature of such substitutions is that metonymy often leads to a compression, in which the whole category is reduced to a single feature or set of features (Manning, 1979), which accounts for prototype effects in categorization when a specific detail or set of details is “used (often for some limited and immediate purpose) to comprehend the category as a whole” (Lakoff, 1987: 79).

Lakoff (1987) stressed that both figures of speech, in combination, are central to the establishment and institutionalization of new categories. In this vein, category emergence can be tracked in future research by focusing on how in the discourse of actors an initially rich set of figurative metaphorical expressions that is used in a tentative way (i.e., marked by interruptions, frequent switches between expressions, or impromptu elaborations and extensions) settles and contracts over time into a discrete set of idioms and metonymic labels that are used in a standard way as shorthand expressions to designate the established category. Following Lakoff (1987), it may well be that the interactions and shifts between the two figures of speech within and across episodes of communication may turn out to be not only reflective but also formative of the institutionalization of new categories.

CONCLUSION

Institutional theory has become one of the most important theoretical perspectives in management and organizational research. In particular, the recent trend to focus more on the social and cognitive microfoundations of institutions presents an important deepening of this perspective. Yet we believe that institutional theory would benefit from a further shift toward the communicative dimension. While it is fair to say that communication in its various forms has already been a key part of institutional analysis, our intention with this STF has been to place it in the front and center of such analysis and to
encourage the further development of a distinct strand of communicative institutionalism.

Our suggestion is rooted in a more general belief that it is important to value and advance various types of communicative approaches—be they rooted in linguistics, discourse or rhetorical analysis, or communication theory. In this introduction we have aimed to underscore the contributions of the various kinds of studies that focus on the performative effects of language on institutions but have also called for further research that attends to the interactive and communicative construction of institutions. The articles in this STF already demonstrate the promise of such research, but there are, of course, many more research avenues and opportunities, and we hope that further work might follow these examples and progress this agenda even further.

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