University of Southern California

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Kevin Murphy
Kenneth L. Trefftzs Chair in Finance and Professor of Finance and Business Economics

USC Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0808

Phone: 
213-740-6553
kjmurphy@usc.edu
Education: 
PhD, MA, University of Chicago; BA, UCLA

Overview

Kevin J. Murphy is an internationally known expert on executive compensation, and is the author of more than forty articles, cases, books, or book chapters relating to compensation and incentives in organizations. Results from his research on executive compensation have appeared in the popular, business and professional press. He is associate editor for the Journal of Financial Economics and Journal of Corporate Finance. From 2004 to 2007, he served as Vice Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs at the Marshall School. Before joining USC, Professor Murphy was on the faculty of the University of Rochester and Harvard Business School.

Research

Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended Consequences • 2013
Pay, Politics, and the Financial Crisis • 2012
Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence • 2012
Executive Compensation: Where we are, and how we got there • 2012
The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation • 2012
The Executive Compensation Controversy: A Transatlantic Analysis • 2012
Executive Packages: Productivity, Profits, and Pay • 2012
CEO Bonus Plans and How to Fix Them • 2012
Relational Adaptation • 2011
Executive Pay Restrictions for TARP Recipients: An Assessment • 2010
Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation Consultants. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (3). • 2010
CEO Pay and what to do about it: Restoring integrity into executive compensation and capital-market relations • 2010
Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs • 2010
Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk • 2009
Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between 'Islands of Conscious Power' • 2008
Executive Stock Options and IPO Underpricing • 2007
Discretion in Executive Incentive Contracts • 2004
Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options • 2003
The Trouble with Stock Options • 2003
Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms • 2003
Expensing will improve compensation decisions • 2002
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm • 2002
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives • 2002
Stock-based executive compensation • 2002
Bringing the Market Inside the Firm • 2001
Option Value Does Not Equal Option Cost • 2001
Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts • 2000
The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the US and UK • 2000
Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options • 2000
Informal Authority in Organizations • 1999
Executive Compensation • 1999
The Economics of Executive Compensation • 1999
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory • 1998
Executive Stock Options: An Economist's Perspective • 1998
Executive Compensation and the Modern Industrial Revolution • 1997
Disney Offers a Model for Executive Compensation • 1997
CEO Pay and Downsizing: The Social Consequences • 1997
Reporting Choice and the 1992 Proxy Disclosure Rules • 1996
Incentives, Downsizing, and Value Creation at General Dynamics • 1995
Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation • 1995
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts • 1994
Governance, Behavior, and Performance of State and Corporate Pension Funds • 1994
Compensation at Lexerd Systems • 1994
Executive Compensation in Corporate America 1993 • 1993
Compensation and Strategy and General Dynamics (A) , (B) • 1993
Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover • 1993
Executive Compensation in Corporate America 1992 • 1992
Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment? • 1992
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence • 1992
Performance Measurement and Appraisal: Motivating Managers to Identify and Reward Performance • 1992
Merck & Co., Inc. (A), (B), (C) • 1991
A New Survey of Executive Compensation: Full Survey and Technical Appendix to 'CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay but How • 1990
CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How • 1990
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives • 1990
Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers • 1990
The Control and Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Comment • 1989
Executive Compensation in Regulated Firms • 1987
Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts • 1986
Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get • 1986
Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Investigation • 1985
Is Executive Compensation Related to Company Performance? • 1985
Beware the Self-Serving Critics • 1984